ambivalence between the construction of the political community with a nostalgia towards empire and this has been important not just in the vote of the white working class people, but also of settled people who come from the ex-empire of the UK.
Some of these ambivalences have a long history, which is shaped by colonial and commercial cosmopolitanism (Vieten 2007; . Even before the EU referendum was on the horizon, there was an unease with some of the civic and political trajectories of Continental Europe which contradicted Britain's primarily liberal market interests (ibid). Since the 1980s Thatcher and Reagan years, with liberal capitalism in power, and later on waiving in EU, austerity', the idea of any social integration beyond mere economic integration of the European bloc has been a contested issue and limited to a large extent to a more left-wing route (Schiek 2012; .
Britain, as a longstanding 'reluctant EU lover' projected some of its post-2008 financial (economic) and social class (structural poverty) crisis as a failure of Europe and blaming EU institutions, regulations and the transnational 'Brussels' elite: The rise of racist attacks in the aftermath of the June 2016 referendum, and the 'special friendship' intonation of some leading Westminster politicians appeasing to the New US governance style and their white Western supremacy tell a story of worse to come.
In this chapter we are going to examine some of the ways Brexit embodies longer processes of the reconstruction of British citizenship. If T. H. Marshall (1950 Marshall ( , 1975 Marshall ( , 1981 defined citizenship 'as full membership in political communities' which encompasses political, civil and social rights as well as responsibilities, we are seeing a process in which border guarding is added to citizenship responsibilities and the boundaries of the political community are being largely redrawn to those who hold British state citizenship rather than those members of civil societies who live in Britain and are holding a variety of EU and other state citizenships. This also signified a collapse of British multiculturalism policy and links into the wider context of the securitisation of visible religious minorities, e. g. Muslim communities, as will be explained later in the chapter. The overall argument here is that Brexit should be as primary technology of controlling diversity and discourses on diversity, which is aimed to undermine convivial pluralist multi-cultural social relations which were the aim of previous technologies of control of British governments in previous decades.
The structure of the chapter will be the following:
Firstly, we explain briefly the double crisis which provides the structural background to contemporary forms of racialisation. bordering', as a reactive government technology of control which in its turn is contributing, as well as being affected by, autochthonic political projects of belonging.
These political projects of belonging, which we see as the predominant form of contemporary racialisations. In the conclusion, the chapter draws together the main arguments and the social and political dynamics of Brexit, also for the Island of Ireland.
The double crisis
Neo-liberal globalization emerged in a period of global optimism after the fall of the Soviet Union and the supposed victory ('end of history' to quote Fukuyama, 1992 ) of democracy, freedom and a mainstream discourse of a cosmopolitan world (e.g. Cheah et Archibugi et. Al. 1998; Beck 2003; Beck & Grande 2007) in which social, national and state borders were on the wane. Less than twenty years later, we find ourselves in a world in which deregulation and globalization have been used to enhance global social inequalities, within as well as between societies', and a deepening systemic signs of neoliberalism's multi-faceted systemic global political and economic crisis, a crisis that is central to relationships between states and societies and to constructions of subjectivity and thus needs to be seen as a double related crisis of both governability and governmentality (Yuval-Davis, 2012 (Eichenberg & Dalton 2007) . Benhabib (2004, 13) has pointed out more than 12 years ago that 'the EU is caught in contradictory currents which move it towards norms of cosmopolitan justice in the treatment of those who are within its boundaries, while leading it to act in accordance with outmoded Westphalian conceptions of unbridled sovereignty toward those who are on the outside…'the negotiation between insider and outsider status has become tense and almost warlike.' This contradictory road of the European project itself in terms of normative frames, lack of legal cohesion and social inclusion has helped to undermine the EU's claim of good governance. (See also Schierup & et. Al., 2006) The results of the UK EU referendum in June 2016 has shown how the distrust of the EU brought a majority of the population across the UK, to vote to leave the EU. This is the time in which it becomes very easy to shift responsibility to those who 'do not belong' -the migrants or anyone else who have different look, accent, culture and religion.
On this background, those of us who have been working on issues of racism, nationalism and ethnic relations, find ourselves with new challenges with the combined emergence of everyday bordering as a technology of control of diversity and discourses on diversity and autochthonic populist politics of belonging in a growing number of places on the globe, to produce new forms of intersectional racist practices.
Everyday bordering
Barth (1998) and others following him, have argued that it is the existence of ethnic (and racial) boundaries, rather than of any specific 'essence' around which these boundaries are constructed that are crucial in processes of ethnocisation and racialisation. Any physical or social signifier can be used to construct the boundaries which differentiate between 'us' and 'them'.
The Alongside this form of a sectarian state of society, usually, state borders are but one of the technologies, used to construct and maintain imagined political community boundaries.
It is for this reason that contemporary border studies largely refer to 'borderings' rather than to borders, seeing them more as a dynamic, shifting and contested social and political spatial processes linked to particular political projects rather than just territorial lines (Houtum & Et. al., 2005 Autochthony is a much more 'empty' and thus elastic notion. It states no more than 'I was here before you' and, as such, can be applied in any situation and can be constantly redefined and applied to different groupings in different ways. It combines elements of naturalization of belonging with vagueness as to what constitutes the essence of belonging, and thus can be pursued also by groups which would not necessarily be thought to be autochthone by others. The notion of autochthonic politics of belonging is very important when we come to understand contemporary populist extreme right politics in Europe and elsewhere. The people who follow these politics continuously argue that they are 'not racist', although they are very much against all those who 'do not belong'. As far as a pan-European discourse of far-right racist populism is concerned the national-territorial notion of autochthony adopts also another layer of trans-national culturalism; a myth of European 'Christian cultural heritage' (Vieten, 2016: 624) . 
Brexit, everyday bordering and autochthonic politics of belonging
As described above, both everyday bordering and autochthonic populist politics can be seen as forms of racialisation. The process of racialisation involves discourses and practices which construct immutable boundaries between homogenized and reified collectivities. These boundaries are used to naturalize fixed hierarchical power relations between these collectivities. Any signifier of boundaries can be used to construct these boundaries, from the colour of the skin to the shape of the elbow, to accent or mode of dress. (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Murji & Solomos, 2005) .
Racialisations have ultimately two logics -that of exclusion, the ultimate form of which is genocide, and that of exploitation the ultimate logic of which is slavery. However, in most concrete historical situations these two logics are practiced in a complementary way. Since the 1980s there has been a lot of discussion on the rise of what Barker (1982) called 'the new racism ' and Balibar (2005) Indeed, David Goldberg (2015) , has linked the spread of the 'postracial society' notion as the logic and condition that enables racism to persist and proliferate.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that that Brexit should be analysed in the context of people and governments' reactions to 'the double crisis of governability and governmentality' It is for this reason of a shifting project of autochthonic politics of belonging that some members of racialised minorities who have settled in the UK, especially those who arrived before the 1981 Nationality Act and were, as coming from countries that used to be part of the British Empire. Back then they were entitled for automatic right to settle and gain UK citizenship. This identification and feeling of belonging to the UK might have influences some to vote for Brexit, feeling that in the Brexit political project of belonging they can belong more than in the EU political project, in which they saw themselves as racialised outsiders. (Vieten 2018 , forthcoming) They could thus join the Brexit autochthonic political project of belonging. Many of them, of course, were bitterly disappointed, with the sharp rise of racist attacks after Brexit towards all racialised minorities.
The motivation of some members of settled racialised minorities in the UK to vote for Brexit is just one particular situated motivations that brought people to vote for Brexit from different sections of British society and this is why a situated intersectional analysis (Yuval-Davis, 2014 ; but see also Crenshaw, 1991; Vieten 2009; Lutz & al, 2011; Hill-Collins & Bilge, 2016 ) is so central in examining social, political, cultural and economic relations. However, the overall implications regarding the effect of Brexit on the relationships between identity, citizenship and the state, has been to highlight and sensitise the boundaries of national citizenship and belonging, excluding all those sections of society who do not carry British passport as well as those the racist imagination would like not to be entitled to.
